1940s andnuclear weapons), the result would probably have

1940s or 1950s had demanded an American military withdrawal from Greenland(for example, because Denmark had a general policy against foreign bases andnuclear weapons), the result would probably have been that Greenland wouldtoday be American (or independent). So Denmark negotiated the concrete issuesbut announced no violation of sovereignty although a foreign power de fact0insisted on having bases on the territory. But there is a counter-illustration:Sweden made a fuss about submarine violation of its territorial waters during the1980s, at a time when it could do nothing about it. Many observers found thisbizarre and self-destructive, because Sweden thereby gave voice to its inabilityto control its own territorial waters (Tunander, 1989, pp. 117-19). They should,of course, have kept quiet (the other party that knew about events could hardlyspeak out) and waited until actually sinking a submarine, before speaking outloudly (cf. also Weber, 1995, on sovereignty and intervention as mutuallyconstituting concepts).Other states have at times extended the demand for non-intervention andthereby sovereignty very far. For instance, the Eastern side during the Cold Warclaimed that trafficking Bibles over the border, transmitting radio, or just puttingforward critical opinion constituted intervention, and therefore such things couldbe stopped by calling on non-intervention and security. That the West at the timehad a narrower, more military-focused concept of security (than the Eastern onewhich encompassed economy, social life, etc.) was not an expression of Western’militarism’, but rather that the West wanted to see these other issues as ‘normalinteraction’, where it was illegitimate to intervene on the grounds of security(Waever, 1989, pp. 301-3). This illustrates the argument from Section 11, that thewidest possible concept of security is not always the most progressive, that it caneasily be a kind of metaphoric militarization of wider societal fields.Struggles over political security typically take the form where some state eliteuses security rhetoric in the name of the state and with sovereignty as thereference point. Even if their actual worry might be something else – regimestability or economic competitiveness – the fact that sovereignty is an internationallyestablished principle of unique dignity makes this the ideal reference forasecuritizing move. The act that one tries to block by this (‘the intervention’) cansometimes also be based on political security reasoning, but then it will usuallybe with reference to principles that have international society itself as referentobject. Examples of such principles are aggression, non-genocide or humanrights on which some state or group of states act; or, most formalized, the securityact where the UN Security Council pronounces ‘a threat to international peaceand security’ and thereby formally obtains extensive competences. The typicalmobilization of security reasoning around states will thus be with at least oneparty defending ‘sovereignty’ and potentially with the other side acting in thename of system-level referents (Buzan et al., 1997, Ch. 7

x

Hi!
I'm Johnny!

Would you like to get a custom essay? How about receiving a customized one?

Check it out